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TO PROTECT AND DEFEND: ASSIGNING PARENTAL RIGHTS
WHEN PARENTS ARE LIVING IN POVERTY
Karen Syma Czapanskiy*
INTRODUCTION
Professor Dwyer asked participants in this symposium to imagine a new way to
identify parents at the birth of a child. His particular request to me was to imagine
a system that puts the interests of the child first in the context of the many children
who are bom into poverty. As embarrassing as it must be to this very wealthy country,
millions of children live in poverty,' so Professor Dwyer's question is a serious one.
My effort here is to give it a serious answer.
My proposal centers on the birth mother because, in my view, doing what is good
for young children usually means doing what seems best to the child's key caretaker.
In the case of infants, the key caretaker is almost always the birth mother. Under my
proposal, she is empowered to decide whether she will be the child's sole legal
parent or whether she will designate another as her parental partner. If she decides
to designate a partner, she can designate whomever she wants; she is not constrained
by presumptions in favor of her spouse or the child's biological father. If she decides
not to designate a partner, or if someone not designated wants to be designated, a
court can overrule her decision only in narrow circumstances designed to protect her
capacity to act in the child's best interests.
Over the next few pages, I attempt to explain how my proposal would affect
current rules in regard to child support, illegitimacy, adoption, co-parenting grandpar-
ents, stepparents, and same-sex couples. I argue that the changes work to the benefit
of most of the children who are born to low-income mothers. The solution I propose
may seem reasonable to some and absurd to others; fortunately, the conventions of
academic discourse allow that to happen. What is important is that we use our
imaginations to make new solutions possible and that we all keep talking until we
come to a solution upon which we can begin to agree.
* Visiting Professor, Columbus School of Law, Catholic University of America; Professor,
University of Maryland School of Law.
For more information on children living in poverty, see KIDS COUNT, State-Level
Data Online, http://www.aecf.org/kidscount/sld/databook.jsp (last visited Mar. 23, 2006).
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1. PROPOSED STATUTORY LANGUAGE
1. Definitions
a. "Parent" includes the woman who gives birth to the child and the designated par-
ental partner.
i. If the child is adopted, the child's adoptive parent or parents are the child's
sole parent or parents.
ii. Each parent is the natural guardian of the child and bears all the responsibili-
ties of a parent.
b. "Eligible person" includes:
i. the mother's partner through marriage or civil union;
ii. the child's biological father [except in the case of a sperm provider who has
no claim to parenthood under applicable state law]; or,
iii. any other natural person who has provided the mother with significant material
and non-material support during the pregnancy and after the birth of the child.
2. A child is the child of:
a. the woman who gives birth to the child; and
b. the person designated by the woman as her parental partner, if any.
c. The designation may occur before or after the birth of the child.
d. To make a designation, the woman must:
i. identify the partner on the form created for that purpose by the bureau of vital
statistics of the state in which the child's birth is recorded and file the form with the
bureau; and
ii. inform the designated partner of the designation by mailing a copy of the form
to the last known address of the designated partner.
e. A woman may not be required to designate a parental partner.
f. A designation may be revoked if the woman
i. revokes the designation within thirty days after the birth of the child; and
ii. informs the designated partner and the bureau of vital statistics of her decision
to revoke the designation within thirty-five days after the birth of the child.
iii. Notice of the decision to revoke must be mailed to the designated partner by
mail to the last known address of the designated partner.
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3. Person Not Designated as Parental Partner
a. After the child is born, but no more than sixty days after the birth of the child, eli-
gible persons not designated as the parental partner by the child's mother may petition
to be named parental partner.
b. After the petition is filed, the mother must be provided with an opportunity to con-
sult with petitioner, with legal counsel, and with such other professionals whose advice
she desires.
c. The mother may agree to designate petitioner as her parental partner uncondition-
ally, may agree to designate petitioner as her parental partner with conditions, or may
decline to designate petitioner.
d. If the mother declines to designate petitioner as her parental partner, the court may
designate petitioner as her parental partner if, and only if:
i. petitioner provided the mother with substantial material or non-material support
during the mother's pregnancy and after the birth of the child;
ii. petitioner has demonstrated a capacity to co-parent the child with the mother;
iii. petitioner has no history of using force or engaging in other unduly coercive
conduct with respect to the mother; and,
iv. petitioner agrees to such conditions as the court deems necessary for the child's
best interests.
e. If more than one person qualifies to be designated as parental partner of the mother,
the court must decide which one to designate based on the best interests of the child.
f. Conditions that may be required by the mother and the court include, but are not
limited to:
i. parental education and training;
ii. payment of child support;
iii. provision of information concerning petitioner's health, location, and identity;
and
iv. custody and access, including, but not limited to, arrangements at the time
the designation decision is made and whether petitioner will be permitted to seek
changes in custody or access in the future.
4. Declining Designation as Parental Partner
a. A person designated as parental partner may decline the designation by notifying
the mother and the bureau of vital statistics of his or her decision to do so.
b. Notification of the decision to decline must be mailed to the mother and the bu-
reau of vital statistics no later than ten days after the person was notified of the mother's
decision to designate the person.
c. If the person is the partner of the mother through marriage or civil union, or if the
person is the biological parent of the child, the person remains liable for child support.
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11. DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSAL
Under my proposal, the birth mother is the only person initially assigned as
parent to the child.2 The birth mother may decide to add a second person as a legal
parent by filing a declaration to that effect with the state and notifying the desig-
nated person. Any person may be designated: the mother's husband, the biological
father, the mother's partner, the mother's parent, or a friend of the mother are all
eligible. Once designated as a parental partner, the person has all the rights and re-
sponsibilities of a parent. A designated parental partner may decline the designation
if he or she does so promptly. A declining designated partner who is also the bio-
logical father, or the marital or civil union partner of the mother, remains liable for
child support. Only in that situation is the mother required to establish marriage, civil
union, or paternity; otherwise, the burden of proving marriage, civil union, or pater-
nity is placed on the putative partner or father. If a mother declines to name a parental
partner, she cannot be required to do so. This provision bars state governments from
requiring the mother who receives public benefits on behalf of the child to establish
the paternity of the child.3
If the birth mother designates a parental partner early in the child's life and
changes her mind within the first month of the child's life, she may revoke the desig-
nation. After that time, she may not revoke her designation. The rationale is that,
immediately after the birth of a child, a woman may experience ambivalence about
her role and the role of others in the child's future. In addition, she may be subject
to undue influence or even coercion about naming a parental partner. Just as in the
case of adoption, therefore, she is given an opportunity to change her mind. Giving
the birth mother an extended period within which to revoke, however, would not be
good for the infant because of the need for the infant to be placed expeditiously with
people who want to commit to raising the child. Further, if the mother designates
a parental partner when the child is older, the child may develop a relationship with
that person. Allowing the mother to revoke the designation, therefore, could prove
harmful not only to the designated partner who relies on the designation but also to
the child.
Under the proposal, certain people wanting to fill the role of parental partner
may petition to be designated over the mother's objection. The category includes
only the mother's marital or civil union partner, the child's biological father, and
people who provided the mother with substantial material and nonmaterial support
during the mother's pregnancy and after the birth of the child.
2 I am omitting, solely for the purpose of avoiding being side-tracked, the difficult issue
of assigning parenthood when the genetic mother, gestational mother, and intended mother
are not the same person.
' States may continue to assert the right to collect child support from already established
legal parents where there is an assignment by one parent or a statutory claim against one or
both parents.
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The petition for designation must be filed quickly - within sixty days after the
birth of the child. If a petition is filed, the proposal calls for giving the mother ac-
cess to advice from a lawyer and members of other professions. She then has three
options: agree to the designation of the petitioner, object to the designation, or agree
with conditions. Permitted conditions include, but are not limited to, parental edu-
cation and training, child support, and restrictions on access and custody, including'
contests of custody.
If the mother objects to designating the petitioner as a parent, the court may de-
signate the petitioner if and only if the petitioner demonstrates that he or she has pro-
vided the mother with substantial material and non-material support, has no history
of violence involving the mother, and has the capacity to co-parent with the mother.
The court may impose conditions on the petitioner of the same sort as the mother
can demand.
The proposal does not specify what evidence would be sufficient to demonstrate
that a petitioner has the capacity to co-parent the child with the mother. It is antici-
pated that the showing would be similar to that made in cases where parents disagree
about whetherjoint custody is appropriate.4 At a minimum, as the proposal provides,
a petitioner cannot succeed when he or she has a history of using force against, or
engaging in other unduly coercive conduct with regard to, the mother. Beyond that
minimum, the petitioner should be required to show that he or she has acted respect-
fully toward the mother, is capable of resolving conflicts in a cooperative manner,
and is willing to consult fully about important parenting tasks and decisions.
I. RATIONALE
A. Interdependency Theory
Key to the proposal is the claim, articulated in several of my earlier articles, that
doing well by children, at least when they are young, requires us to do well by their
caretakers, usually their mothers. I call the idea "interdependency theory."5 The
theory is grounded in the reality that society does not raise children; parents or other
caretakers raise children. Children are dependent on at least one adult for their care.
If that person does a good job, all of society stands to benefit when the child matures
' See, e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-9-209 (West 2005); Taylor v. Taylor, 508 A.2d 964,
970-75 (Md. 1986); Hughes v. Hughes, 560 A.2d 1145, 1153 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989);
AM. L. INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DIsSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS §§ 2.11, 2.12 (2000).
' Karen Czapanskiy, Grandparents, Parents and Grandchildren: Actualizing Interdepen-
dency in Law, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1315 (1994); Karen Czapanskiy, Interdependencies, Families,
and Children, 39 SANTACLARA L. REv. 957,957-58 (1999); Karen Syma Czapanskiy, Parents,
Children, and Work-First Welfare Reform: Where Is the C in TANF?, 61 MD. L. REV. 308
(2002).
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and enters adult society. If the person does poorly, the child is more likely to suffer
the experiences that make successful transition into adulthood less likely.
Adults who are responsible for children live different lives from adults who do
not have such responsibilities. Just as the child is dependent on the adult, the adult
is dependent on others in society for material, emotional, social, and symbolic support.
Society should not begrudge the resources because society is also dependent on the
parent or caretaker to do the best job he or she can for the child. Interdependency
theory predicts that the best outcomes for children occur when the parent or care-
taker on whom they depend receives adequate support and respect for caretaking
from the people and institutions on which the parent or caretaker depends in turn.
My proposal satisfies interdependency theory. It focuses on the person most likely
to be the child's caretaker, the birth mother. It accords that person the autonomy to
decide whether, with whom, and on what terms to partner as a parent. That autonomy
translates into an opportunity to demand respect and resources for the caretaker for
the benefit of the child.6
I agree with Professor Dwyer that we should be skeptical of the claims of some
parents.7 He and I disagree on which ones and how they should be handled. Under
my proposal, the mother is the only person accorded the presumption of parenthood.
Professor Dwyer denies that presumption to some birth mothers and permits the
courts to determine if the mothers in some categories should be awarded legal parent-
hood.8 Under my proposal, it is the right of the birth mother to designate a second
parent. As in Professor Dwyer's proposal, she is not required to designate her hus-
band.9 She is permitted, however, much more latitude than Professor Dwyer proposes,
since she can designate anyone and is not required to designate anyone.'l Professor
Dwyer would deny legal parenthood to some people who could be designated by the
mother unless they satisfy a court of their suitability." Further, Professor Dwyer
would allow the court to designate a second legal parent over the birth mother's
objection in many more cases than I would allow. 12
6 Karen Czapanskiy, Volunteers and Draftees: The Struggle for Parental Equality, 38
UCLA L. REv. 1415 (1991) (exploring how mothers and fathers differ under the law in their au-
thority to demand autonomy, respect, and resources for themselves as parents); see also Marcia
Carlson & Sara McLanahan, Strengthening Unmarried Families: Could Enhancing Couple
Relationships Also Improve Parenting? (Ctr. for Res. on Child Wellbeing, Working Paper No.
2005-26-FF, 2005), available athttp://crcw.princeton.edu/working papers/WP05-26-FF.pdf.
The notion that parents should have the right to enter into contracts about their joint
parenthood and the many ways in which such contractual relationships already exist to define
parents are explored by Professor Katharine K. Baker in Bargaining or Biology? The History
and Future of Paternity Law and Parental Status, 14 CORNELLJ.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1 (2004).
7 See JAMES G. DWYER, THE RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 254-57 (2006).
s See id. at 257-62, 266-67.
9 See id. at 259, 265-66.
10 See Part II, supra.
" See DWYER, supra note 7, at 259-62.
12 id.
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My differences with Professor Dwyer flow from interdependency theory. Part
and parcel of supporting the parent/caretaker of a child is respecting his or her auton-
omy and assuming, as a result, that he or she has more capacity than anyone else in
the world to make decisions for the child that are beneficial to the child. In any
individual case, that assumption may be false. Disproving it is the work of the neglect
and abuse system, however. Since the assumption of capacity is right on vastly more
occasions than it is wrong, I am willing to put it into play when deciding who the
child's first legal parent should be.
Professor Dwyer argues that, in a limited set of situations, we can predict that
the assumption of capacity will be false in a large percentage of the cases. 3 Rather
than wait for a faulty abuse and neglect system to catch up with these parents later
on, he would empower courts to deny parental status to many of them at the outset.'4
He is not proposing to disqualify automatically these men and women from parent-
hood because of his concern that depriving a woman of the hope of gaining legal
parenthood of the child is an incentive for her to hide the pregnancy, avoid prenatal
care, and otherwise engage in negative behavior during her pregnancy. 5 He sees
the judicial proceeding through which she can gain legal parenthood as an adequate
response to the disincentive. 6
I could not disagree more. It seems essential to me that we respect the auton-
omy of parents; requiring them to justify themselves in court is as much a disincen-
tive for women to respect themselves as parents as automatically depriving them of
that right. This seems to me particularly true in poor communities where courts are
viewed with the greatest distrust and fear, especially in light of a long history in most
communities of using the neglect and abuse system to remove children largely because
their families are poor.
B. Single Parenthood
Under my proposal, a mother is permitted to parent alone. The state cannot re-
quire her to change her mind. A court's authority to designate a parental partner is
severely limited.
The principal benefit to the child of allowing a woman to be a single parent is
security. After Troxel v. Granville,7 it is clear that a parent who has no co-parent is
insulated from a variety of threats to her custody and other aspects of parental author-
ity. This autonomy is particularly important for women who live at or near poverty,
13 See id. at 256-57.
See id. at 254-67.
See id. at 271.
16 See id.
'" 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (holding that parenting decisions made by fit parents are due def-
erence).
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as most single mothers do. 8 They cannot afford legal help to defend themselves
against custodial challenges or even objectionable claims to visitation; restricting the
number of people who can mount such challenges protects not just the mother but
also the child who is dependent on the mother for care and for financial support.' 9
Sole parenthood relieves the mother from worry that a violent or abusive father can
challenge her for custody. Even when protecting the child is not at issue, the child
may suffer when a mother's custody is threatened because litigation itself is a distrac-
tion from parenthood, and children usually need the best their parents can give. Finally,
some parents use custody threats as part of a system of control over the mother, not as
a way to foster a parent-child relationship or otherwise help the child.2'
I am assuming that few mothers would act irrationally when it comes to the
emotional and financial interests of their infants. Therefore, few would decline to
designate as their parental partner a husband, a civil union partner, or a sexual partner
who is a likely source of material or non-material support.2' Further, few will choose
to parent alone because raising a child alone is no picnic. If a woman, knowing the
negative consequences, decides not to designate a parental partner, it is probable that
she has persuasive reasons for her choice. Perhaps her husband has subjected her
to threats or violence or otherwise given her reason to believe he would detract from
'8 David T. Ellwood & Christopher Jencks, The Spread of Single-Parent Families in the
United States Since 1960, in THE FUTURE OF THE FAMmY 25, 26-27 (Daniel P. Moynihan
et al. eds., 2004).
"9 See Elizabeth S. Scott, ParentalAutonomy and Children's Welfare, 11 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 1071, 1095 (2003). In recognition of the burdens of litigation on the children's
household, the Court in Troxel did not remand the case for further proceedings at the trial
level, although that would otherwise be customary.
20 See Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 360-62 (W. Va. 1981).
21 Indeed, the principal researchers in the fragile families study group report:
One of the most striking findings ... is the high level of motivation
among new unmarried parents. At the time of their child's birth, half of
unmarried mothers are living with the fathers of their children and ano-
ther third are romantically involved with the fathers but living apart ....
... [T]he majority of unwed parents are optimistic about their
future together.... Most fathers say they want to help raise their child
and the overwhelming majority of mothers say they want the fathers to
be involved.
Sara McLanahan & Irwin Garfinkel, Strengthening Fragile Families (Ctr. for Res. on Child
Wellbeing, Working Paper No. 02-14-FF, 2002), available athttp://crcw.princeton.edu/working
papers/WP02-14-FF-McLanahan.pdf. In one of the study's locations, every mother "planned
to put the father's name on the child's birth certificate and to formally establish paternity,"
and all the fathers wanted both that recognition and to establish formal paternity. Sara
McLanahan et al., Unwed Fathers and Fragile Families 12 (Ctr. for Res. on Child Wellbeing,
Working Paper No. 98-12, 1998), available at http://crcw.princeton.edu/workingpapers/WP98-
12-FF-McLanahan.pdf; see also Kathryn Edin & Joanna M. Reed, Why Don't They Just Get
Married? Barriers to Marriage Among the Disadvantaged, 15 FUTURE OF CHILD. 117 (2005).
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her capacity to raise the child.22 If she is right, her decision to keep her husband
away from the child is, more likely than not, a decision that will benefit the child
emotionally. 23 If she is wrong, she can designate him as her parental partner at a
later time, either unconditionally or with conditions that give her a sense of security
about his continued supportive conduct.24
My proposal stands in contrast to the marriage initiatives that have become inte-
gral to welfare reform and other public policy proposals whose advocates argue that
marriage is an antidote to child poverty.25 It may be true that children who are raised
by their own biological parents tend to have somewhat better outcomes than children
22 See P. Lindsay Chase-Lansdale, The Developmentalist Perspective: A Missing Voice,
in THE FUTURE OF THE FAMILY, supra note 18, at 166, 168 (finding high levels of domestic
abuse in empirical and ethnographic studies of extremely low income families); Irwin
Garfinkel et al., Fragile Families and Welfare Reform: An Introduction, 23 CHILD. & YOUTH
SERVS. REv. 277, 283-84 (2001) (finding that fathers in fragile families study who were no
longer romantically involved with the mothers were much more likely than the cohabiting
fathers to abuse substances and report high depressive symptoms; fathers who were not
available for interview were reported to have more physical and mental health problems than
the fathers who were interviewed and, for example, were reported by mothers to be twice as
likely to have been violent toward the mother).
23 See Jane C. Murphy & Margaret J. Potthast, Domestic Violence, Substance Abuse, and
Child Welfare: The Legal System's Response, 3 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 88, 91 (1999);
Maureen Waller & Raymond R. Swisher, Fathers' Risk Behaviors in Fragile Families:
Implications for "Healthy Marriages" 23,34,35 (Ctr. for Res. on Child Wellbeing Working
Paper No. 02-18-FF, 2005), available at http://crcw.princeton.edu/workingpapers/WP02-18-
FF-Waller.pdf (finding that based on fragile families data, mothers of children whose fathers
exhibited risk factors such as domestic violence, substance abuse, and incarceration more fre-
quently terminated their own relationships with the fathers and monitored the fathers' relation-
ships with children). "[T]here is evidence that in high-conflict families, children whose parents
divorce experience better adult outcomes than those whose parents remain together .... "
Wendy Sigle-Rushton & Sara McLanahan, FatherAbsence and Child Well-Being: A Critical
Review, in THE FUTURE OF THE FAMILY, supra note 18, at 116, 127.
24 For further exploration of the relationship between power struggles and the decisions
made by single mothers in poverty to marry, see Ellwood & Jencks, supra note 18, at 50-52.
25 See generally Wade F. Horn, Marriage, Family, and the Welfare of Children: A Call
for Action, in THE FUTURE OF THE FAMILY, supra note 18, at 181; cf. Nancy Folbre, Disin-
centives to Care: A Critique of U.S. Family Policy, in THE FUTURE OF THE FAMILY, supra
note 18, at 231; Frank F. Furstenberg, Values, Policy, and the Family, in THE FUTURE OFTHE
FAMILY, supra note 18, at 267, 268; Adam Thomas & Isabel Sawhill, For Love and Money?
The Impact of Family Structure on Family Income, 15 FUTURE CHILD. 57 (2005); Wendy
Sigle-Rushton & Sara McLanahan, ForRicher or Poorer?: Marriage as Poverty Alleviation
in the United States (Ctr. for Res. on Child Wellbeing Working Paper No. 2001-17-FF, 2003),
available at http://crcw.princeton.edu/workingpapers/WP0 1- 17-FF-pub.pdf.
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who are raised by single parents or one parent and a stepparent.26 However, even
if it were undisputed, that claim is not an adequate argument for a legal requirement
that a second parent be established for every child or for a rule that the establishment
of fatherhood occur through a marital presumption.27
More will be said on the first claim later, especially as it affects the lives of
mothers and children who live in poverty. The marital presumption is supportable
as a child welfare measure only if it can be demonstrated that it somehow supports
the continuation of relationships between adults in ways that assist children. While
marriage itself appears to have such a beneficial impact, why should it be assumed
that the marital presumption adds to the benefit? In other words, would a man or a
woman decide to marry in modem America solely because the child being carried
by the woman would thereby become her partner's legal child? Possibly, in a few
cases, but establishment of paternity by simple affidavit seems to do the same thing.
It seems much more likely, particularly among poorer parents, that the decision to
marry has little to do with legal parenthood.28 On the other hand, according a marital
presumption of fatherhood to the mother's husband can be detrimental to the child,
as discussed below.
My proposal does not require that every mother in poverty parent alone. Instead,
it gives her a choice. She can parent alone or she can choose a partner. If she chooses
a partner, it can be anyone she wants, regardless of her marital status and any bio-
logical tie between the man and the child. That is, my proposal largely de-privileges
marriage and biology as routes to fatherhood. The route to fatherhood lies not in
status but in a simple, function-based test. A mother may decide to designate a man
as her parental partner. If she does, the status attaches; marriage or biology alone
are inadequate to establish or compel the establishment of the status. If she does
not, the person seeking parental status must satisfy the mother or the court that he
can function as a parent.
The function-based test should benefit poor children. Single parenthood has
increased most in recent decades among women with relatively low income-earning
capacity.29 For example, in the mid-1990s, over forty percent of children whose
26 See Paul R. Amato, The Impact of Family Formation Change on the Cognitive, Social,
and Emotional Well-Being of the Next Generation, 15 FuTuRE OF CHILDREN 75 (2005);
Furstenberg, supra note 25, at 269-70; Wendy Sigle-Rushton & Sara McLanahan, FatherAb-
sence and Child Well-Being: A Critical Review, in THE FUrURE OF THE FAMILY, supra note
18, at 116.
27 For a description of the working of the marital presumption, see Baker, supra note 6,
at 12-13.
28 Indeed, among poorer couples, the decision to marry is increasingly postponed until
after a child has been born.
29 Ellwood & Jencks, supra note 18, at 38 ("Single motherhood has spread faster among
women with lower potential earnings.").
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mothers had not finished high school were living with single parents.30 For these
mothers to establish legal fatherhood requires, at minimum, that the man sign the
affidavit of paternity offered to him in the hospital. 3' The affidavit is then used to
support a presumption of paternity in the paternity proceeding which follows in
which the mother bears the burden of proof.32 If he does not sign, the mother must
initiate a paternity proceeding under which she must demonstrate the man's biolo-
gical paternity.33 Under my proposal, all the mother need do to create a legal father
for her child is to designate him; unless he declines the designation, no further pro-
ceeding is needed.
If the mother is married at the time the child is born, she is likely to designate
her husband as her parental partner.34 If she does not, there is likely a reason for her
decision that is important to her and that is likely to be important to the child. If the
husband believes otherwise, he can petition for designation and the mother may be
forced to accept him as a co-parent. In that situation, however, the father will have
to meet the functional tests of the statute. If he may fall short as a parent, both the
mother and the court can impose conditions that should increase the chances of his
becoming a good father to the child, in financial and other ways.
The mother may be married to another man at the time she conceives a child
with a boyfriend. This is more likely to be true when the woman lives at or near
poverty because she may not have adequate resources to get a divorce when she is
ready for one. Her estranged husband, enjoying a presumption of paternity over any
child conceived or born during the marriage, can cause difficulties and delays in
establishing legal fatherhood in the child's biological father. Under my proposal,
the mother can designate her boyfriend as the child's father. While her husband can
petition for a designation, the designation is not his as a matter of right.
Finally, after the child's birth, a mother may marry or become a partner with
someone other than the child's biological father, again something that happens not
infrequently in lower-income communities.35 To empower the mother's husband to
act as the child's father or guardian, the mother and her husband must seek a step-
parent adoption. If the biological father objects, the adoption cannot be granted unless
30 See id. at 36-38.
3' 42 U.S.C. § 666 (a)(5)(C)(ii) (2000) (requiring hospitals to provide putative fathers with
ability to file paternity papers at hospital); see also IOWA CODE ANN. § 252A.3A (West 2000);
MD. CODE ANN. [HEALTH-GEN.] § 4-208 (West 2005); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1914 (West
2002).
32 See DISPUTED PATERNITY PROCEEDINGS § 2.02 (5th ed. 2005).
33 id.
14 See Furstenberg, supra note 25, at 273-74 (finding the desire of mothers to marry and
to have the support of the father strong, but noting they want to "feel more confident about
the prospects of marriage").
3' Nancy Folbre, supra note 25, at 242; Bendheim-Thoman Ctr. for Res. on Child Well-
being, Multiple Partner Fertility (Fragile Families Research Brief No. 8, June 2002).
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the biological father's rights are terminated. Standards for termination vary from
state to state, but, generally speaking, proof of abandonment, serious neglect, or abuse
is required. The process can be time-consuming and expensive.
Under my proposal, stepparent adoption is unnecessary if the mother had not
previously designated the biological father or anyone else as her parental partner.
She can simply designate her spouse as her parental partner. If the biological father
objects, it is up to him to petition for designation over the mother's objections. He
might succeed, but, unlike the present situation, his parental status could be condi-
tional to ensure that the child benefits from his designation.
Stepparent adoptions are generally granted by courts with little investigation
into the suitability of the mother's choice of partner because it is assumed that the
mother, who remains a legal parent after the stepparent adoption, will act in the
child's best interests. My proposal takes that same presumption and expands it to the
benefit of low-income women who are doing their best to parent but cannot easily
afford the time and expense of a legal proceeding.
The importance of simplifying stepparent adoption became clear to me when
many parents became fatally ill with HIV/AIDS in the 1980s and 1990s. As I saw
in my practice, their attempts to plan for their children's security were often stymied
by the legal rights of biological parents whose shared guardianship became sole
guardianship once the caretaking parent died. This was not a problem when the sur-
viving biological parent was involved in the child's life and was prepared to con-
tinue caring for the child after the principal caretaking parent became disabled by
illness or died. When that was not the case, however, stepparent adoption would
have been a route for keeping the child in the care of a familiar person after the death
of a caretaking parent. Because stepparent adoption cannot occur without the
consent or termination of parental rights of the child's other biological parent, many
caretaking parents did not attempt it. In some cases, they were concerned that
notifying the other parent of the child's situation would cause more legal and per-
sonal problems for everyone. In other cases, the mere thought of a judicial pro-
ceeding was just too intimidating. And others were unwilling to engage in litigation
that would require them to say derogatory things about their former partner, either
because of fear of retaliation or because they were not convinced that the person's
poor parenting record was proof of poor personhood.
C. Child Support, Welfare, and the State
Under my proposal, a child's right to child support would change. Mothers would
be permitted to parent alone, which would give the child only one parent from whom
to seek support. It would also eliminate the opportunity for the state to force a mother
to designate a person against whom a child support proceeding is undertaken by the
state. Further, certain people who are currently liable for support would not be liable,
while others who are not currently liable would become liable.
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My proposal does not change the duty of the mother who, as legal parent, would
owe the same duty to support as she does now. A parental partner designated by the
mother or the court would also bear the duty of support. Some of these people do
not bear the duty now because, as non-adoptive stepparents, they generally do not
have an ongoing parental duty to the child. The mother's husband, civil union part-
ner, or the biological father would bear no presumptive duty of support because they
would have no presumptive parental rights. A duty of support would arise only if he
or she is designated as a parental partner by the mother or the court, regardless of
whether he or she accepts the designation. On its face, the concept of relieving certain
people of the duty of child support seems contrary to the child's financial well-being
because it may result in some children not being entitled to financial support to which
they currently have a right. Nonetheless, I think it is a fair and justifiable proposal.
First, a mother may decide not to designate a person as a parental partner because
she fears him. Child support enforcement proceedings may add to her vulnerability
because such proceedings increase the probability that he will use violence against
her.36 Her self-protective decision is beneficial to the child because the child is
better off not being a witness to family violence or being in a high-conflict family.37
Under current law, a mother who receives certain public benefits can be required to
cooperate in the child support proceeding despite the mother's concerns.3" My
proposal empowers some mothers to just say no.
Second, a mother's decision not to designate her husband or partner or the child's
biological father as her parental partner may or may not make a difference to the child
economically. If the mother designates someone else as her parental partner and that
person accepts, the child is entitled to support from that person as well as the mother.
Under current law, the mother cannot create such a duty in a third party except though
adoption, a judicial process that requires the consent of the presumed or biological
36 Angela R. Fertig et al., Child Support Enforcement and Domestic Violence Among
Non-Cohabiting Couples (Ctr. for Res. on Child Wellbeing, Working Paper No. 02-17-FF,
2004), available at http://crcw.princeton.edu/workingpapers/WP02-17-FFRevised.pdf (con-
cluding that stricter child support enforcement increases risk of domestic violence among non-
cohabiting mothers receiving TANF who have not obtained a legal entitlement to child
support); see also Angela R. Fertig et al., The Effect of Child Support Enforcement on Bar-
gaining Power Among Married and Cohabiting Couples (Ctr. for Res. on Child Wellbeing,
Working Paper No. 05-08-FF, 2005), available at http://crcw.princeton.edu/workingpapers/
WP05-08-FF-Fertig.pdf; Naomi Stem, Battered by the System: How Advocates Against Do-
mestic Violence Have Improved Victims'Access to Child Support and TANF, 14 HASTINGS
WOMEN'S L.J. 47, 48-49 (2003).
" See Garfinkel et al., supra note 22, at 12.
38 See Stacy L. Brustin, The Intersection Between Welfare Reform and Child Support
Enforcement: D.C. 's Weak Link, 52 CATH. U. L. REv. 621 (2003); Bridget Remington,
Comment, It Takes a Father? Conforming with Traditional Family Values as a Condition
of Receiving Welfare: Morals Reform and the Price of Privacy, 32 STETSON L. REV. 205,208
(2002).
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father or a finding that he has abandoned the child. Judicial proceedings can be be-
yond the means of low-income or middle-income families and can disrupt a child's
life, so they should be required only when absolutely necessary. A court's involve-
ment is not likely to change the circumstances of a child's daily life, since the
mother is free to live with the third party regardless of whether an adoption has been
decreed. Further, unless and until the adoption is final, no duty of support arises in
the third party selected by the mother to be her parenting partner. In the meantime,
the child's financial welfare can be impaired.
Third, the proposal may not make a difference to the child's economic well-
being because the mother's decision not to designate her spouse, civil union partner,
or sexual partner as her parental partner is not final. If the person wants to be desig-
nated despite the mother's doubts about him or objections to him, he can offer her
assurances of his intention to be a good parent to the child and partner to her. She
and a court can condition his designation on an enforceable child support promise.
This short-circuits the paternity and child support establishment proceedings and
should make the mother's collection of child support more secure. Keeping a family
out of court is almost always a benefit to the child.
Fourth, my proposal puts the mother in a strong bargaining position to gain finan-
cial support for a child. Today, a father's easiest route to legal parenthood is through
the courts; he can sue or wait to be sued for paternity. If he wants to be a father and
he is the mother's husband or sexual partner, his claim to paternal status is nearly
impossible to deny.39 If he does not want the status, he has no burden to disprove his
presumptive fatherhood; the burden to prove his status is on the mother.4° In neither
situation does the mother have as much power as she would under my proposal to
confer the status of fatherhood and ensure that it is awarded to a person willing to
provide support to the child.4'
" The principal exception to that statement is where the child of a married mother was
fathered by a different sexual partner. States are permitted to make the husband's presumptive
claim for fatherhood irrebuttable. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 129-30 (1989).
Under the Uniform Parentage Act, the competing claims to fatherhood are adjudicated using
the child's best interests, similar to what I am proposing here. Uniform Parentage Act § 608,
9 U.L.A. 45 (2000). For a full description of the procedures for achieving legal fatherhood,
see Baker, supra note 6.
4 In many states, the burden is to demonstrate paternity by clear and convincing evidence,
not merely by the preponderance of the evidence standard - a reminder that paternity pro-
ceedings have a history in the criminal law and that the testimony of mothers about their sexual
partners was often considered untrustworthy. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
4' The interplay of child support enforcement, welfare, and the decision to marry is dif-
ficult to sort out, but it appears that strong child support enforcement may in fact discourage
cohabiting low-income couples from deciding to marry. See Marcia Carlson et al., The Effects
of Welfare and Child Support Policies on Union Formation, 23 POPULATION RES. & POL'Y
REv. 513, 534 (2004).
956 [Vol. 14:943
To PROTECT AND DEFEND
42Fifth, many fathers theoretically subject to a child support duty do not pay.
Despite many improvements, enforcement remains a difficult and time-consuming
task. Further, exaggerated claims about the availability of child support helped to
support the claims made for welfare reform that child support would provide an
adequate substitute for public benefits in many cases.43 Eliminating the right of the
state to force a woman to establish paternity in someone she does not want as a
parental partner would introduce more honesty into the system and help demonstrate
that many low-income families with children need governmental support because
the private support available to them is insufficient, even when coupled with their
mothers engaging fully in paid employment." It also seems likely that informal
economic and social support offered by many low-income fathers and their families
is more important to their children than the small amounts of child support the
fathers can pay, especially when the child support often goes to reimbursing the state
for public benefits rather than to the child's household.45
Sixth, there is a small but apparently growing group of cases in which men are
relieved of paternal duties when they later find that the putative biological connection
between them and the child does not exist.46 The child support duty of course ends
when the father-child relationship is found not to exist.47 My proposal avoids this
issue because the status of parental partner is not dependent on the existence of a bio-
logical tie between the parental partner and the child. Therefore, termination of the
status cannot occur when a father learns of the absence of the biological tie or when
a mother tries to eliminate an existing parent-child relationship because of the absence
of a biological tie. Under my proposal, parental status turns more on function than on
biology. Where a mother is prepared to share her parental rights and responsibilities
42 See Will Marshall & Isabel V. Sawhill, Progressive Family Policy in the Twenty-First
Century, in THE FUTURE OF THE FAMILY, supra note 18, at 198, 212 (noting that although
child support contributes over twenty-five percent of family income for poor children who
get it, two-thirds of nonresident fathers of children in poverty do not pay formal child support).
41 See Karen Syma Czapanskiy, Al Child Support Principles: A Lesson in Public Policy
and Truth-Telling, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 259, 259 (2001).
4 See id. at 262, 266-67; Harry D. Krause, Child Support Reassessed: Limits of Private
Responsibility and the Public Interest, 24 FAM. L.Q. 1, 24-28 (1990).
41 See Garfinkel et al., supra note 22, at 282-83 (finding that the average unwed father
in study earned about $17,000 a year and theoretically could contribute nearly $3,000 a year
in child support; however, enforcing an order of that amount might drive fathers into under-
ground economy).
' See Melanie B. Jacobs, When Daddy Doesn't Want to Be Daddy Anymore: An Argument
Against Paternity Fraud Claims, 16 YALEJ.L. & FEMINIsM 193, 193-95 (2004); Paula Roberts,
Truth and Consequences: Part L Disestablishing the Paternity of Non-Married Children, 37
FAM. L.Q. 35, 51 (2003).
41 In at least one case, repayment was ordered of child support paid before a paternity judg-
ment was vacated. Mathison v. Clearwater County Welfare Dep't, 412 N.W.2d 812 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1987).
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with another, and that person agrees to enter into the partnership, neither partner
should be able to use biology as an excuse to sever the resulting parent-child relation-
ship on which the child depends.
D. Illegitimacy
My proposal eliminates the category of illegitimacy. That is, children of married
parents and children of unmarried parents are treated exactly the same with regard
to identifying a legal parent or parents. My proposal is intended to put to rest finally
the issue of illegitimacy and the last vestiges of all claims that a child is entitled to
different treatment, whether better or worse, because of the marital status of his or her
parents.
One could regard this part of the proposal as trivial or, at best, symbolic, since
the negative consequences of illegitimacy have declined over at least the last three
decades. Symbolic claims can still persuade judges, however. For example, in Mary-
land, an unmarried father has the right to adopt his children over the mother's ob-
jections in order to legitimate them, even though doing so terminates the mother's
rights.4" However, a formerly married mother cannot adopt, even with the father's
consent, because her adoption would render her children illegitimate.49
To me, the story is more than symbolic because the status of illegitimacy con-
tinues to have an impact on the lives of many children. The greatest impact is im-
posed on the non-marital children of American fathers by non-American mothers.
Impoverished children of immigrant parents are the hardest hit by illegitimacy, as
the parent's opportunity to confer citizenship on the child depends on the marital status
of the parents.50
48 Bridges v. Nicely, 497 A.2d 142, 148 (Md. 1985) (discussing adoption of illegitimate
child over mother's objection); Dawson v. Eversberg, 262 A.2d 729 (Md. 1970) (same propo-
sition).
49 Green v. Sollenberger, 656 A.2d 773,778 (Md. 1995) (denying mother's petition even
though father had given his approval because mother' s husband at the time of the petition did
not join in the petition and the adoption would have left the children "fatherless").
SO See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53,57-60 (2001) (holding that illegitimate son of an Amer-
ican father and a Vietnamese mother was not a citizen and could be deported where the father
had not legitimated son, even though the son lived with the father and had been a lawful
permanent resident since age of six); see also Miller v. Christopher, 96 F.3d 1467, 1468, 1472
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (denying citizenship to an illegitimate daughter of an American father and
a Filipino mother; holding that the statute imposing additional requirements for illegitimate
children of American fathers was not unconstitutional); David A. Isaacson, Correcting Anom-
alies in the United States Law of Citizenship by Descent, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 313 (2005); Manisha
Lalwani, Comment, The "Intelligent Wickedness" of U.S. Immigration Law Conferring Citizen-
ship to Children Born Abroad and Out-of-Wedlock: A Feminist Perspective, 47 ViLL. L. REV.
707 (2002); Ashley Moore, Note, The Child Citizenship Act: Too Little, Too Late For Tuan
Nguyen, 9 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 279 (2003); Melanie L. Shender, Note, Nguyen v.
INS: No, Your Honor, Men Are Not from Mars, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1023 (2003).
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Some states continue to use the parents' marital status as a determinant of
intestacy rights, with children of unmarried parents facing greater burdens in estab-
lishing their entitlement than children of married parents.5' In addition, entitlement
under intestacy laws often is connected to entitlement to public benefits needed by
a child, such as worker's compensation52 or social security benefits. 3
E. Maternal Equality
Under the law as it stands today, there is no requirement that a father be recog-
nized for a child of an unmarried mother, so long as the mother has sufficient financial
resources to keep her off welfare and so long as she is careful about initiating her
pregnancy without authorizing a paternity claim by the sperm provider. A woman
who is married, who is poor, or who is not in a position to use an anonymous sperm
bank is in the opposite situation. The woman's husband has a presumptive claim to
paternity. If the woman is on welfare, the state can force her to sue her sexual partner
for paternity and child support. And non-anonymous sperm providers can sue for
paternity.
"' Estate of Griswold, 24 P.3d 1191, 1194,1200 (Cal. 2001) (allowing inheritance by the
father's family from estate of an illegitimate child where the father had acknowledged the
child, even if the father did not have relationship with the child); Estate of Carter, 4 Cal. Rptr.
3d 490 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that illegitimate children must be notified of probate
proceedings where their identities are known; here, illegitimate children were dependent on
decedent and known to administrator; finding that notice is not required where illegitimate
children are not acknowledged or known); In re Estate of Ginochio, 117 Cal. Rptr. 565 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1974) (upholding statute that distinguished between legitimate and illegitimate chil-
dren for inheritance purposes when the putative father is decedent; finding the establishment
of paternity for child support insufficient to establish inheritance rights); In re Estate of Miller,
524 N.W.2d 246 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (allowing illegitimate child to inherit from father's
estate despite statute barring inheritance, as father had acknowledged her and paid child support);
Miller v. Watson, 467 So. 2d 672, 675 (Miss. 1985) (allowing illegitimate child to inherit from
grandmother's estate despite statute and the parties' stipulation that the child was the illegit-
imate child of decedent's son). But see Rainey v. Chever, 527 U.S. 1044 (1999) (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (arguing that the father of an illegitimate child should not be allowed to inherit
from the illegitimate child where the father had failed or refused to support the child and had not
legitimated the child); Susan N. Gary, The Parent-ChildRelationship UnderIntestacy Statutes,
32 U. MEM. L. REV. 643 (2002).
52 Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 165 (1972) (striking down Louisiana's
workmen's compensation statute that denied benefits to illegitimate children when parents
could not be married).
5' Abkes v. Apfel, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1149 (N.D. Iowa 1998) (denying Social Security sur-
vivor benefits to an illegitimate child where the putative father was not listed on birth certi-
ficate, had not been adjudicated as the father, and had not been involved in the prenatal care
of the child, even though the father spent time with the child in the three months between the
child's birth and the father's death).
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The difference among mothers who can legally parent alone and those whose
sexual partners are recognized as fathers sounds like an issue of equity that affects
adults, not children. Since this paper is about the best interests of children, there-
fore, it can be argued that the issue is irrelevant. I disagree. The heart of interdepen-
dency theory is the recognition that what affects a child's parent or caretaker affects
the child. Little falls into the category better than the issue of whether the mother is
permitted to parent alone or must accept a parental partner by operation of law.
The case of Green v. Sollenberger54 illustrates my concern. A husband and wife
divorced after she gave birth to three children.5" After a number of years of struggle,
during which the father rarely paid support 6 but during which he could challenge
the mother for custody and visitation if he wished, the parents decided to stabilize
the situation in the best way they thought available to them. With the father's con-
sent, the mother petitioned for a decree of adoption, which was granted.57 At some
point prior-to the adoption, the mother had become so poor that she qualified for
welfare.58 The state required reimbursement from the father for the benefits it paid
to the mother.59 The state's claim against the father was grounded in the mother's
mandatory assignment of her child support rights to the state. 6° When the father
asserted the adoption - and corresponding severance of his parental relationship
with the child - as the basis for his refusal to satisfy the state's claims for reimburse-
ment, the state successfully sued to set aside the adoption decree. 6' The appellate
court's rationale included the claim that the children were deprived of legitimacy by
the adoption and that the mother's husband should have joined in her adoption peti-
tion.6' The result of the decision was the return to the status quo. The father was not
going to pay child support voluntarily; the mother was not going to have the assurance
that the father could not, in a moment of anger about the child support, sue her for
custody and, regardless of whether he succeeded, use the litigation to disrupt the life
she was building for the children.
By arguing that all mothers, regardless of economic or marital status, should
have the right to parent alone, I am not arguing that all fathers are bad. What I am
arguing is that the initial decision about whether a woman will be a better parent to
her children if she is their sole parent is not a decision that the state should make for
her. She is in the better position to decide whether her children will get more of
54 656 A.2d 773 (Md. 1995).
51 Id. at 775.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 id.
6 Id. ('To receive public assistance, [the mother] was required to assign her right to
obtain child support payments from [the father] to the State.").
61 Id.
62 Id. at 778.
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what they need in terms of security and stability from her alone or from her working
together with a parental partner. In few cases will she decide against sharing the
work and struggle and joys of parenthood with a parental partner. In those few cases,
some women will make the wrong decision. But the tradeoff is that, in the much
larger group of cases, children will be well-served by their mother's decision.
I am also advocating that a woman's right to parent alone should not be unli-
mited. If she allows a parent-child relationship to develop between the child and the
child's father or some other parental partner, then she should be made to stand by
her decision and not permitted later to exclude that partner on the basis of her parental
autonomy. When the child is an infant or about to be born, the mother is in the great-
est need of financial, physical, and emotional support. When a person steps forward
to provide such support, whether a husband, civil union partner, grandmother, or
friend, and the mother accepts the support, the mother should be made to stand by her
decision and not permitted later to exclude that partner on the basis of her parental
autonomy. But where a spouse, civil union partner, or sexual partner has the oppor-
tunity to provide support to a pregnant woman or new mother and fails to do so, and
the mother decides not to give him or her a second chance, my proposal would
permit her the authority to exercise autonomy. Today, only wealthy, unmarried women
can make that choice. They alone can be assured that their custody cannot be chal-
lenged by an uninvolved second parent, and they alone can share that sense of security
with their children. Under my proposal, all mothers will have the same opportunity.
F. Same-Sex Parents
Because the birth mother can designate a parental partner, my proposal simplifies
the process for recognition of the parental status of a woman's partner in a same-sex
relationship. Under current law, in states that recognize co-adoption by same-sex part-
ners, the non-biological partner gains parental status through an adoption petition.63
In states that recognize parental status arising from civil union or marriage of same-
sex partners, parental status is achieved through entry into such a relationship.' 4
Neither is required under my proposal. In the even more difficult situation of people
living in states that do not recognize co-adoptions, my proposal eliminates the conun-
drum of choosing between one partner having no legally-recognized parental relation-
ship or seeking an adoption that terminates the rights of the birth mother.65
63 See, e.g., Sharon S. v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 554 (Cal. 2003).
64 See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. 15, § 1204 (2005).
65 The problems of establishing parenthood in two same-sex partners are legion and well
documented. See David L. Chambers, What If? The Legal Consequences of Marriage and
the Legal Needs of Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 MICH. L. REV. 447 (1996); David L.
Chambers & Nancy D. Polikoff, Family Law and Gay and Lesbian Issues in the Twentieth
Century, 33 FAM. L.Q. 523 (1999); Nancy D. Polikoff, Lesbian and Gay Parenting: The Last
Thirty Years, 66 MONT. L. REv. 51 (2005); Nancy D. Polikoff, The Impact ofTroxel v. Granville
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The birth mother's designation of her partner does not mean that challenges are
impossible: if the birth mother is married or in a civil union, or if the sperm was not
provided through an anonymous process, a petition for designation can be filed, and
the court will have to decide which of the proposed parental partners should be recog-
nized. Lesbian mothers may be subject to bias by the court as a result of homophobia.66
By limiting the opportunities for petitions to a small category of people and by mak-
ing it difficult for any of them to qualify, however, I am trying to reduce the oppor-
tunities for a court to make a biased decision. Simplifying the process leading to legal
recognition of two mothers is beneficial for their children because it ensures the secur-
ity over the long haul of their relationship to each parent, provides for guardianship
and support rights in two adults, and diminishes the need for litigation over the adop-
tion early in a child's life.
While my proposal provides benefits to the children of lesbian partners, it is not
quite as helpful to gay male parents - although it is better than current law. I am as-
suming that a common route for gay men to become parents together is for them to
co-adopt a baby born to a woman who is inseminated with the sperm of one of the
partners. Alternatively, the child may have been born to a woman who became preg-
nant by another man. Depending on the scenario, the outcomes may differ under my
proposal.
In both scenarios, the birth mother can designate one of the gay men as her pa-
rental partner and thereby give him legal recognition as one of the child's parents.
In the first scenario, where one of the gay men is biologically related to the child,
his parental status is subject to challenge only if the woman is married or in a civil
union at the time the child is conceived or born. The marital or civil union partner can
sue for recognition, and it will be up to the court to determine whether recognition of
the petitioner is better for the child. The problem can be avoided if the gay men and
on Lesbian and Gay Parents, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 825 (2001); Mark Strasser, Adoption and the
Best Interests of the Child: On the Use and Abuse of Studies, 38 NEW ENG. L. REv. 629
(2004); Leah C. Battaglioli, Comment, Modified Best Interest Standard: How States Against
Same-Sex Unions Should Adjudicate Child Custody and Visitation Disputes Between Same-
Sex Couples, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 1235 (2005).
Important changes are happening in this area. In three cases decided by the California
Supreme Court in 2005, children raised by same-sex partners were found to be the children of
both partners for all purposes, including custody, visitation, and child support, even though none
of the children had been adopted by the non-biologically-related partner and none of the adults
had registered as domestic partners. See Kristine H. v. Lisa R., 117 P.3d 690 (Cal. 2005);
K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673 (Cal. 2005); Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005).
In Washington State, the woman who helped raise the biological child of her former les-
bian partner was accorded full parental rights as a "de facto" parent over a strong dissent. In re
Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161 (Wash. 2005). My proposal appears to yield the same result
in each case. The process, however, would be simpler and the outcome settled earlier in the life
of the child.
6 See Chambers & Polikoff, supra note 65, at 536-37.
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the birth mother understand the consequences of her marriage or civil union and
avoid the issue. In the second scenario, the birth mother's designation of one of the
gay men as her parental partner can be challenged if the child's biological father
petitions for recognition. Again, the court must decide whether the child's best inter-
ests are served by recognizing one man rather than the other.
In either of the petitioning scenarios, the gay men may be subject to bias on the
basis of their homosexuality. This very troubling issue cannot be resolved fully by
my proposal without undermining the authority of birth mothers in general. As with
the situation of lesbian mothers, I am hopeful that the opportunities for a court to act
out of bias are reduced by the boundaries within which it must work when it is tempt-
ed to override the mother's designation. Assuming that the birth mother designates
one of the gay men as her parental partner, and no other candidate for designation pe-
titions or prevails, the intended parents must still take another step to complete the
process. The second father must petition to co-adopt the child. Presumably, the birth
mother will consent to the adoption. As with lesbian parents under current law, where
co-adoptions are not recognized by the state where the couple resides, the non-
designated partner will be faced with the Hobson's choice of acting as a parent to
a child with whom he has no legal relationship or seeking to adopt under a law that
will terminate the parental rights of all preexisting parents, including the designated
parental partner. This is a poor outcome; I think its resolution lies in the arena of
the reform of adoption law rather than in the arena of reform of the law of parental
recognition.
G. Correcting the Overreaction to Lehr, etc.
Beginning with Stanley v. Illinois,6 7 the Supreme Court decided a number of cases
concerning the rights of fathers of non-marital children. In several cases, the Court
expanded the rights of non-marital fathers to participate in the decision of whether
their biological child should be adopted. In each of these cases, the man's rights
turned on the degree to which the man had participated in the rearing of the child in
ways analogous to what the Court saw as the role of the marital father.68 In no case
to date has the Court decided what the rights of non-marital fathers should be in
regard to infants whose mothers seek to have them adopted at birth. Most states
have reformed their adoption laws to give biological fathers a role in that decision.69
67 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
68 Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979);
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
69 See Laurence C. Nolan, Preventing Fatherlessness Through Adoption While Protecting
the Parental Rights of Unwed Fathers: How Effective Are Paternity Registries?, 4 WHHTIER
J. CHILD &FAM. ADvoc. 289, 300-01 (2005) (discussing state adoption law reforms requiring
that unwed fathers be given notice before their children are adopted).
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As the result of these reforms, critics have asserted, fathers are permitted to parti-
cipate even when they have not been supportive of the mothers during birth and
have no plans to take the child into their care should the adoption fail due to the
absence of their consent.7°
I think allowing more rights to non-marital fathers is, in general, a good thing
for children. Expanding the rights of fathers - whether marital or non-marital - in
the adoption of newborns is not in that category, however. My proposal would re-
verse that trend by giving the birth mother the right to designate her parental partner.
If she declines to designate a partner or decides to designate as her partner only some-
one she intends to become the parent of her newborn along with a different partner
(i.e., a proposed adoptive parent), then her decision can be overridden only if the per-
son seeking designation has provided her with support and care before the child's
birth. In other words, a biological father must earn his way into the decisionmaking
moment with respect to the adoption of a newborn, just as the existing Supreme Court
cases teach in respect to older children.
My proposal eliminates claims to decisionmaking authority by fathers - whether
biological or marital - who have created a child with a woman whose needs they
then ignore. When the wompan has decided to undertake the risks of pregnancy alone,
she needs the assurance that she will be empowered to make the decisions she thinks
best for the child.7
My concerns are illustrated by the story of a botched adoption in which I repre-
sented the proposed adoptive parent. The child was born as the result of a rape for
which the man was convicted. The mother was in poor health, both physically and
mentally. She placed her child in the care of her mother, the child's grandmother.
When the child was young, the mother consented to the adoption of the child by the
child's grandmother. We argued that notice to the father and his consent to the adop-
tion was not required by law because the pregnancy was the result of a rape. The
court disagreed, under a fair interpretation of the state's law, which goes far beyond
the protections for fathers' rights required by the Supreme Court.72 The grand-
mother, fearful about the mother's mental stability, refused for a time to pursue the
adoption because she feared what the father would do after being notified of the pro-
posed adoption. In the meantime, the mother's steadfastness about her consent to
the adoption varied depending on how she was feeling that week. In the end, the adop-
tion never occurred. The child remained with the grandmother, but the grandmother's
70 See Nancy E. Dowd, Rethinking Fatherhood, 48 FLA. L. REv. 523 (1996); see also
Elizabeth Bartholet, Beyond Biology: The Politics of Adoption & Reproduction, 2 DuKE J.
GENDER L. & POL'Y 5 (1995); Elizabeth Bartholet, Guiding Principles for Picking Parents,
27 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 323 (2004); Nancy E. Dowd, Essay, From Genes, Marriage and
Money to Nurture: Redefining Fatherhood, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 132 (2003).
7' See Naomi Cahn, Perfect Substitutes or the Real Thing?, 52 DuKE L.J. 1077, 1161
(2003).
72 See Lehr, 463 U.S. 248; Caban, 441 U.S. 380; Quilloin, 434 U.S. 246.
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legal status as the child's only parent was left unresolved. As a result, whenever the
mother's situation changes or her health deteriorates, she threatens to remove the
child from the grandmother's care. While the grandmother tries to shield the child
from the tumult, so far as I can tell, the child's sense of security is less than ideal -
and for good reason. The child needs a caretaker who can protect her from harm; the
law, by empowering the biological father to have a role in the adoption regardless
of his history with the biological mother, has undermined the child's best interests.
H. Grandparents, Parents, and Kids
Among families in poverty, multi-generational support systems are not uncom-
mon, particularly when a new child is born. 3 A classic example is described in the
case of Garska v. McCoy.74 Although the case is better known for its primary care-
taker presumption, the facts illustrate a parenting strategy familiar to many young
women who are in poverty when their first child is born: seeking help from members
of the extended family.75 In Garska, the mother was living with her grandparents
when the baby was born.76 The baby's ill health led the mother and her grandparents
to conclude that adoption by the grandparents was in the child's best interests because
the child could then benefit from health insurance available to the grandparents.77
When the father was notified of the adoption action, he objected, despite having had
insignificant involvement with the child prior to that time.78 The adoption action
was dropped.79 The father's claim for custody was granted by the trial court80 and
overturned by the West Virginia Supreme Court in a decision establishing the primary
caretaker presumption."'
Under my proposal, the mother could designate her grandfather as her parental
partner. His standing as parent begins upon the designation. The biological father
is entitled to petition for designation. Under the facts as described in Garska, it is
unlikely that the court would have replaced the grandfather and designated the bio-
logical father as the parental partner over the mother's objection. First, it appears that
7" See Czapanskiy, supra note 5, at 1315-16.
74 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981).
" See U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Examining American Household
Composition: 1990 and 2000, at 27 (2005), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/
censr-24.pdf (finding that multi-generational households grew from 3 million in 1990 to 4.2
million in 2000, a change of thirty-eight percent, and as a proportion of all households, house-
holds with three or more generations grew from 3.3 percent to 3.9 percent from 1990 to 2000).
76 Garska, 278 S.E.2d at 359.
77 Id.
78 id.
79 Id.
so Id.
S Id. at 361, 364.
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the father did not provide the mother with material or nonmaterial support during
the pregnancy, and his support of the mother and child after the child's birth was
minimal, not substantial. Second, since he did not make himself available to help
the mother with the child, he cannot establish a capacity to co-parent with her through
a history of conduct. He might be able to establish a capacity to co-parent to the satis-
faction of many courts because he is a good person who is able to get along with
others. However, he will have a hard time meeting the third criterion concerning coer-
cive conduct toward the mother because he impregnated her when she was a teenager
temporarily staying with her mother. Given her age and his "roommate" relationship
with her mother, it is hard to describe their sexual relationship as the voluntary act
of two adults.
Even if the father were to overcome the barriers to eligibility for designation,
he cannot replace the grandfather as the designated parental partner unless the court
makes a further decision that it is in the child's best interests for that to occur. Under
the Garska facts, that outcome would be unlikely. The grandfather assisted the
mother after the birth of the child, provided her with a home and support, and offered
to adopt the child to make health insurance available. By contrast, the father showed
little regard for the well-being of either the mother or the child. Only a court com-
mitted to an ideology of fathers' rights would come to the conclusion that giving the
father parental rights and excluding the grandfather from that role is in the child's
best interests. It will be much more difficult under my proposal than under current
law for a court to exercise its bias in that direction.
CONCLUSION
Far too many children in the United States are born into poverty or experience
poverty during their minority. Compounding the misery they may experience be-
cause of the indigency of their families, these children face hardships because the
law recognizes the wrong people as their initial legal parents. In this article, I have
argued that the initial assignment of parenthood should be limited to the birth
mother. In most cases, she will decide to add the child's father as a parental partner.
Giving her the autonomy to decline to do so, I argue, gives her opportunities to bar-
gain for better conditions for the child and avoids creating legal rights in a person
who is not, in her estimation, going to behave well as a parent.
The proposal is a radical one even though it is likely to affect the reality of few
children. It is radical because it empowers single mothers. In my view, this empower-
ment is essential for the well-being of all children, but especially for children who are
born into poverty. They are most in need of protection from unwarranted interven-
tions by the state as well as by claimants for parenthood who may not have the chil-
dren' s best interests at heart. Under my proposal, birth mothers would have greater
autonomy to decide whether to parent alone or with a partner or a grandparent, whether
[Vol. 14:943
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a child should be adopted, and whether to seek child support. The child is provided
with security that the relationship with the mother cannot be easily disrupted by some-
one who has no functional relationship with the child. The child is also protected
from negative consequences associated with being labeled illegitimate.
If given the opportunity to protect their children and to advance their interests,
most mothers, like most fathers and other caretakers, will do as well as they can. That
is all we can ask, and, most of the time, it will be as close as we can come to what the
child will need. Under my proposal, mothers and their parenting partners would be
granted more opportunities to protect and defend their children; they need nothing less.
